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Abstract
The paper explores incentives for strategic vertical separation of rms in a framework of
a simple duopoly model. Each rm chooses either to be a retailer of its own good (vertical
integration) or to sell its good through an independent exclusive retailer (vertical separation).
In the latter case a two-part tari¤ is applied. Retailers compete in quantities, goods are
perfect substitutes and rms cost functions are quadratic. I show that the equilibrium
outcome crucially depends on the degree of (dis)economies of scale and asymmetry of costs.
Two asymmetric equilibria arise, in which one rm separates while another integrates, under
conditions that both rmscost functions exhibit a su¢ ciently high diseconomies of scale,
or extreme asymmetry of costs. Under a moderate asymmetry of costs a unique equilibrium
exists in which the rm with the lower degree of diseconomies of scale separates, while its
rival integrates. With the degree of diseconomies of scale low for both rms in the unique
equilibrium both rms separate.
JEL classication: L22; L42
Keywords: Vertical oligopoly; Vertical Separation; Vertical Integration, Delegation
1 Introduction
The paper examines incentives for strategic vertical separation of rms in Cournot duopoly
settings. Vertical separation is dened as selling through an independent exclusive retailer, while
vertical integration as selling directly to nal consumers. It follows the traditional approach in
assuming that, in the case of separation, a rm chooses both the wholesale price, at which he
will supply to his retailer, and the franchise fee. So, in this context, separation means that the
rm delegates the decision of the quantity to be sold to his retailer, in which case it controls the
retailers objective (retailers prot function). Using the franchise fee the rm extracts the entire
retailers prot, with the wholesale price being used to set the optimal incentive scheme o¤ered
to the retailer. In the case of integration the rm is a retailer of its own good and, as such, the
rms objective is maximization of own prot.
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The subject of the possible advantages of vertical separation in strategic duopoly games has
been receiving growing attention in the recent economic literature on rm behavior. Bonanno and
Vickers (1988) consider a duopoly model with linear costs in which each manufacturer makes the
decision of whether to separate or integrate. Assuming price competition among retailers, these
authors show that vertical separation is both in the collective, as well as individual, interests of
the rms, so that in the equilibrium both rms sell their products through independent retailers.
Thus, in the unique equilibrium both rms separate. Lin (1988) considers a model in which
the consumers have the discrete choice of buying either one unit of good or not at all and the
retailers compete in prices. The author shows that the Nash equilibria of the game are such that
either both rms separate, or both integrate. Festmann and Judd (1987) consider separation
under Cournot competition with linear demand and constant marginal costs. They show that
both manufacturers have an incentive to separate and the resulting equilibrium generates greater
output, lower prices and more e¢ cient allocation of production than the Cournot equilibrium.
If the rmscost functions are symmetric, both rms receive lower prots compared to the ones
in the Cournot equilibrium of the game. Under asymmetry of the costs, the more e¢ cient rms
prot may be higher than in the Cournot equilibrium of the game. These authors also show
that, in the case of Bertrand competition with di¤erentiated products, the owners want their
managers to set higher prices, for eliciting higher prices from the competing managers too, with
the result that the unique equilibrium, in which both rms separate, generates higher prots and
lower output compared to the Bertrand equilibrium. Sklivas (1987) studies a delegation problem
in which the owners set the objective functions for their managers at a rst stage and, then,
managers make a decision. His ndings are close to Festmann and Judd (1987). The owners
always take advantage of the separation and, in the case that duopolists compete in quantity
(prices), both rms earn lower (higher) prots. Gal-Or (1991) considers a model of Bertrand
competition between retailers and nds that, in the presence of low product di¤erentiation, the
producers may benet from the double marginalization arising with linear pricing. Such double
marginalization results in higher retail prices, with the e¤ect of relieving competitive pressure.
Although the author does not make explicit consideration of the separation decision of rms,
her ndings imply that manufacturers gain from separation, if they can extract all the retailers
prots. Basu (1995) considers a model of managerial delegation in a duopoly with a linear
demand, constant marginal costs and competition in quantities. Under the assumption of xed
costs associated with separation, the author shows that asymmetric equilibria arise, even in the
symmetric-cost case. In this model, in the absence of xed costs, if only one rm separates, the
prot of the separated (integrated) rm is higher (lower) compared to the Cournot equilibrium.
If both rms separate, each rms prot is strictly lower than in the Cournot equilibrium. The
author, further, shows that there exists a level of the xed cost such that, with only one rm
separating, the nal prot of the separated rm is still higher than its Cournot prot, moreover,
the prot of the integrated rm is higher than in the case of both rms separating. Thus, if
separation is associated with additional costs, asymmetric equilibria arise and the outputs levels
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are as in a Stackelberg equilibrium. Janson (2003) considers a Cournot oligopoly game with
a linear demand and constant marginal costs, in which he assumes that separation implies a
xed contracting cost. In this case, asymmetric equilibria emerge, when the Cournot oligopolists
supply close substitutes. So, a summary of the literature would be as follows: when goods are
imperfect substitutes, under Bertrand competition with constant marginal costs, it is both in the
private and the collective interests of the rms to separate. In the case of Cournot competition
with a linear demand and constant marginal costs, it is in private interest, but not in the collective
interests of each rm to separate. If the case of symmetry of rms, their prots are strictly lower
than in the Cournot equilibrium. In the presence of a xed cost associated with separation,
asymmetric equilibria may arise.
In this paper, I extend the earlier analysis by allowing for increasing marginal costs of pro-
duction and, in particular, for quadratic cost functions. I show that the equilibrium structure
critically depends on the slopes of the marginal cost functions (in other words, on the degrees
of diseconomies of scale) and the asymetry of costs . If the slopes of both marginal cost func-
tions are su¢ ciently low in the unique equilibrium of the game both rms separate. Under a
moderate asymmetry of costs, in the unique equilibrium of the game, the more e¢ cient rm
separates, whereas the less e¢ cient one integrates. Asymmetric equilibria (one rm separating,
the other delegating) arise in two cases: rstly, if the slope of each manufacturers marginal cost
is su¢ ciently high, secondly, if the cost asymmetry is extremely high. The model shows that
the optimal distribution policy of a rm depends on both its own and its rivals cost structures.
This provides a possible explanation for the widely observed asymmetry in the sales strategies
among rms1 . A strong prediction of the model is that with symmetry of rms, the equilibrium is
determined by the degree of diseconomies of scale: if this degree is low, then both rms separate,
whereas if it is high, two asymetric equilibria exist. The intuition for these results is as follows.
If rm 1 separates and the rm 2 integrates, the rms get the same prots as in a Stackelberg
game, with the separated rm being a Stackelberg leader2 . Suppose two symmetric rms sep-
arate. Each rm has an incentive to set a low enough wholesale price in order to increase its
retailers output and its nal prot. This results in higher output and lower prots comparing to
the Cournot outcome. A central question in this case is whether the rmsprots are lower than
the Stackelberg followers prot. The key di¤erence in the case of linear costs is the strength of
competition in the wholesale prices. A decrease in, say, the rm 2s wholesale price results in a
decrease in the rm 1s output, and hence in the rm 1s marginal cost3 . The rm 2s output, as
well as the total output, increases, thus the rm 1s marginal revenue declines. The rm 1s best
reply, in this case, is to restore a balance between its marginal cost and revenue. If the slope of
the rm 1s marginal cost function is high enough, the decline in its marginal cost is higher than
1See Buehler and Schmutzler (2005) and Janson (2003) for a detailed discussion of the empirical observations
over the asymmetry in vertical structures.
2Separation serves as a commitment mechanism in this case: the separated rm commits its retailers high
output by setting a low wholesale price.
3This obviously cannot occur if the rmsmarginal costs are constant.
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that in marginal revenue, and the rm 1 prefers to increase its output. That is, the rm 1 should
decrease its wholesale price as a response to a decrease in its rivals wholesale price. In this case,
under symmetry of the rms, the rmswholesale prices are strategic complements. In this case,
competition between manufacturers in wholesale prices may be tough, and it results in high out-
put levels, and therefore in low rmsprots, so these may be lower than a Stackelberg followers
prot. Hence, each rm prefers to integrate (and to obtain the Stakelberg follower prot), given
that its competitor separates and asymmetric equilibria arise in a completely symmetric game.
Suppose now there is a cost asymmetry, that the rm 1 separates, the rm 2 integrates, and
lets consider the incentive of the rm 2 to deviate to separation. Separation of the rm 2 has a
twofold e¤ect: rstly, in the absence of the rm 1s reaction, the rm 2 could increase its prot
by setting its wholesale price at an appropriate level. The increase in rm 2s prot depends on
its own cost structure: the lesser e¢ cient the rm 2 is, the lesser the gain obtained. Secondly, if
the rm 1s wholesale price is a complement to the rm 2s wholesale price, the rm 1s reaction
may imply a signicant decrease in its wholesale price, therefore a signicant increase in the total
output, which decreases the rm 2s prot. The latter e¤ect may dominate the former in two
cases: rstly, if the rm 2s marginal cost curve is steep enough. In this case the possible gain
from an increase in its retailers output is small. Secondly, if the rm 1s marginal curve is very
steep, hence the rm 1s wholesale price is a strong complement to the rm 2s wholesale price.
In this case, an increase in the retailer 1s output is high. Thus, if a rms, or its rivals, marginal
curve is very steep, the rm prefers to integrate, given its rival separates, implying the existence
of two asymmetric equilibria. In contrast, if a rms marginal curve is at, without its rivals
marginal cost curve being very steep, the rm separates, given that its rival separates. In this
case there is a unique asymmetric equilibrium in which the more e¢ cient rm separates, while
the less e¢ cient rm integrates. Finally, if both marginal curves are su¢ ciently at, the rst
e¤ect dominates the second for both rms and in the unique equilibrium both rms separate.
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the model and provides the
characterization of equilibrium under general assumptions on demand and cost functions. Section
3 provides an analysis for the case of quadratic cost and liner demand functions and discusses the
robustness of results. Finally, Section 4 concludes. The proofs of the propositions are relegated
to the Appendix A.
2 The general model and characterization of equilibrium
The rms F1; F2 produce homogeneous good. Let Ci(qi); i = 1; 2 be the cost functions. Let
P (q1+q2) denote an inverse demand function. In the general case, with the following assumptions
on the demand and the costs function4 .
4Altough this paper provides nal results for quadratic costs and linear demand functions only an analysis in
this section allows to discuss robustness of results and also it highlights driving forces in the model.
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Assumption 1. C 0i(qi) > 0;C
00
i (qi)  0; for any qi  0.
Assumption 2. P 0 < 0;P 0 + P 00qi < 0;9Q > 0 : P (Q) = 0:
At the rst stage of the game, each rm decides whether to sell the good through an in-
dependent exclusive retailer, or directly to nal consumers, being a retailer of its own good.
Following Bonanno and Vickers (1988), I refer to the former case as vertical separation and to
the latter case as vertical integration. Thus, at the rst stage each rm chooses from the action
m 2 M;M = fS; Ig; where S and I are interpreted as the choice of the rm to separate and
integrate, respectively. If the rm Fis choice is S; it further sets the two-part tari¤ (wi; Ai)
on his retailer, where wi is the wholesale price of the good and Ai is a franchise fee. At the
second stage of the game, the decisions of the rst stage are observed5 and the retailers compete
choosing their quantities simultaneously and independently. The prot of the integrated rm i is
P (q1+q2)qi Ci(qi). If the rm i separates,its own and its retailers prots are wiqi+Ai Ci(qi)
and P (q1 + q2)qi   wiqi  Ai, respectively.
2.1 The downstream equilibria
The game has four subgames corresponding to the choice m 2M = fI; Sg taken by each rm at
the rst stage. If each rm is vertically integrated, the rm is maximization problem is
max
qi
i = P (q1 + q2)qi   Ci(qi); i = 1; 2: (1)
Given Assumptions 1 ansd 2, the game (1) has a unique Nash-Cournot equilibrium.
Let fqC1 ; qC2 g denote equilibrium quantities and Ci = P (qCi +qCj )qCi  Ci(qCi ); i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j
denote the equilibrium prots in this subgame6 . The equilibrium is characterized by the rst-
order conditions: P 0qCi + P   C 0i = 0; i = 1; 2.
If both rms are vertically separated, the rm i chooses fwi; Aig to solve its maximization
problem:
max
fwi;Aig
i = wiq

i +Ai   Ci(qi ); i = 1; 2;
where qi = argmaxqifP (qi+qj )qi wiqi Aig; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j are the output levels resulting in
the retailerscompetition. By choosing an appropriate level of a franchise fee, each rm extracts
5 It is assumed that decissions of the rst stage are irreversible and therefore there is no commitment problem.
6Upper index C indicates the outcome of the subgame (Integrate; Intergate) is a Cournot outcome.
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all its retailers surplus. Thus, the rm iproblems may be written as:
max
wi
i = P (q

1 + q

2)q

i   Ci(qi ); i = 1; 2;
s:t: qi = argmax
qi
fP (qi + qj )qi   wiqig:
Hence, for any given fw1; w2g the retailerschoice of fq1 ; q2g satises the rst order conditions:
P 0qi + P   wi = 0; i = 1; 2: (2)
and the rmschoice of fw1; w2g is a solution of the system:
@i
@wi
= P 0qi

@qi
@wi
+
@qj
@wi

+ P
@qi
@wi
  C 0i
@qi
@wi
= (3)
= (P 0qi + P   C 0i)
@qi
@wi
+ P 0qi
@qj
@wi
= 0;
i; j = 1; 2:
Plugging P 0qi + P = wi into (3) we obtain (wi  C 0i) @q

i
@wi
+ P 0qi
@qj
@wi
= 0 and the equilibrium
values fw1; w2g and fq1 ; q2g satisfy:
wi = C
0
i   P 0qi
@qj
@wi
=
@qi
@wi
; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j: (4)
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, qi (w1; w2) and q

j (w1; w2) satisfy
@qi
@wi
< 0 <
@qj
@wi
<
 @qi@wi  ; i; j = 1; 2,
therefore wi < C 0i: Thus, if both rms separate, in the equilibrium each rm sets its wholesale
price lower then its marginal cost. Considering the e¤ect of change in wj on wi, an application
of the implicit function theorem to (4) gives:
dwi
dwj
=
d
dwj
C 0i   ddwj (P 0qi 'i)
1  ( ddwiC 0i   ddwi (P 0qi 'i))
= (5)
=
(C 00i   P 0'i) @q

i
@wj
  P 00 @Q@wj qi 'i   P 0qi
@'i
@wj
1  (C 00i   P 0'i) @q

i
@wi
+ P 00 @Q

@wi
qi 'i + P 0q

i
@'i
@wi
;
i; j = 1; 2:
where Q = qi + q

j and 'i =
@qj
@wi
=
@qi
@wi
. Note that under a linear demand function: P 00 = 0 ,
'i = const 2 [ 1; 0], @'i@wj =
@'i
@wi
= 0, i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j. Then dwidwj =
(C00i  P 0'i)
@qi
@wj
1 (C00i  P 0'i)
@q
i
@wi
and
sign

dwi
dwj

= sign (C 00i   P 0'i). Clearly, if the cost functions are also linear, wi and wj are
always strategic substitutes. In contrast, if C 00i is su¢ ciently high,
dwi
dwj
> 0, resulting in wi
wj .being strategic complements. The intuition of this result is as follows: A decrease in wj results
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in an decrease in qi and an increase in q

j . Moreover, the total output increases (
@Q
@wi
> 0). If
C
00
i > 0; both the rm is marginal cost and its marginal revenue decrease (
d
dwj
C 0i = C
00
i
@qi
dwj
< 0
and ddwj (P
0qi 'i) < 0). The rm is best response depends on the relative magnitudes of the
changes in the marginal revenue and marginal cost. If
 ddwjC 0i >  ddwj (P 0qi 'i), the best response
implies increasing qi, and decreasing wi, hence dwidwj > 0. If
 ddwjC 0i <  ddwj (P 0qi 'i), wi and
w2 are substitutes. For the analysis it is crucial that higher slopes of the rms marginal cost
curves result in a lower degree of substitution. With the slopes steep enough, w1 and w2 are
complements. If both rms separate, both set the wholesale price bellow marginal cost. If the
rms are symmetric (C1(q) = C2(q)), each rm has a higher output and lower prot than in
the Nash-Cournot equilibrium. Moreover, the greater dwidwj is, the greater is also the di¤erence
between the Cournot and equilibrium outcomes in the subgame with the two rms separating.
Let fqS1 ; qS2 g be the equilibrium quantities and Si = P (qS1 + qS2 )qSi   Ci(qSi ); (i = 1; 2) the
equilibrium payo¤ of this subgame.
If the rm i integrates and the rm j separates, the rm j chooses wj to solve its maximization
problem:
max
wj
j = P (q

i + q

j )q

i   Cj(qj )
where:(
qi = argmaxqi P (qi + q

j )qi   Ci(qi)
qj = argmaxqj P (q

i + qj)qj   wjqj
:
The equilibrium values of fqi ; qj g satisfy the rst order conditions:(
P 0qi + P   C 0i(qi) = 0
P 0qj + P   wj = 0
: (6)
Note that both reaction functions determined by (6) are decreasing, the rm is best response
function does not depend on wj and it is the same as in the subgamewith both rms integrating.
The retailer js best response function is determined by the rm js choice of wj at the rst stage.
Thus the rm j varying wj (i.e. shifting its retailers best response curve) may yield any point
on the rm is best response curve as an equilibrium outcome. Clearly, the equilibrium output
is the same as under Stackelberg competition with the rm j being the leader. Let fqFi ; qLj g and
fFi ; Lj g denote the equilibrium quantities and prots, with the upper indices F and L referring
to the integrated and separated rms respectively7 .
7The upper index F (L) indicates that the integrated (separated) rm obtains the Stackelbergs followers
(leaders) prot.
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2.2 The upstream equilibrium
We summarize the previous results in the following table:
M 2
Separate Integrate
M 1 Separate S1 ; 
S
2 
L
1 ; 
F
2
Integrate F1 ; 
L
2 
C
1 ; 
C
2
Under Assumptions 1 and 2 we have that Li > 
C
i > 
F
i and q
L
i > q
C
i > q
F
i ; i = 1; 2:
Therefore the subgame fI; Ig is never an equilibrium outcome. Finally, the equilibrium is deter-
mined by a relation of manufacturersprots Li ; 
F
i and 
S
i ; i = 1; 2 and fS; Ig is equilibrium if
F2  S2 ; fI; Sg is equilibrium if F1  S1 ; fS; Sg is equilibrium if F1  S1 and F2  S2 . Note
that if Fi > 
S
i ; i = 1; 2, there are two asymmetric strict equilibria fS, Ig and fI, Sg; whereas
if Fi > 
S
i and 
F
j < 
S
j there is a unique asymmetric strict equilibrium, in which the rm i
integrates and the rm j separates.
3 Linear demand and quadratic costs
Consider the case of a linear demand P (q1 + q2) = 1   q1   q2 and quadratic cost functions
Ci(qi) =
1
2diq
2
i with di  0; i = 1; 2. Since P (Q) and Ci(qi) satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2, there
exist a unique Nash equilibrium in the Cournot game.
If both rms integrate, they play a standard Cournot game:
max
qi
i = (1  qi   qj)qi   1
2
ciq
2
i ; i;= 1; 2
The Nash equilibrium outcome of the game satises the rst order conditions and yields the
solution:
1  (2 + di)qi   qj = 0:
qCi =
1 + dj
(3 + 2di + djdi + 2dj)
and Ci =
(2 + di)(1 + dj)
2
2(3 + 2dj + djdi + 2di)2
; i; j = 1; 2:
If both rm separate, the rst order conditions of the retailersprot maximization problems
1  2qi   qj   wi = 0; i; j = 1; 2
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gives the optimal outputs as functions of (w1; w2), with total output and price:
qi =
1  2wi + wj
3
; i; j = 1; 2
Q =
2  w1   w2
3
; P =
1 + w1 + w2
3
The rmsmaximization problems are given by:
max
wi
i =
1 + wi + wj
3
1  2wi + wj
3
  di
2

1  2wi + wj
3
2
; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j:
with rst order conditions giving the rmsreaction curves in the space fw1; w2g :
wi =
( 1 + 2di)(1 + wj)
4(1 + di)
; i; j = 1; 2 (7)
It holds that: dwidwj =
( 1+2di)
4(1+di)
is strictly increasing in di; dwidwj

di=0
=   14 ; dwidwj

di=1=2
=
0; dwidwj !di!+1
1
2 . Hence, the degree of substitution between wi and wj decreases in di; when
di < 1=2; and wi is complement to w2, when di > 12 : Note that if di >
1
2 and di <
1
2 then
dwi
dwj
> 0 and dwjdwi < 0, That is, wi is a complement to wj whereas wj is a substitute for wi.The
system (7) has a solution fwi = 2di 2dj+4didj 15+6di+6dj+4didj ; i; j = 1; 2g: The equilibrium quantities and
prots are given by:
qSi =
2 + 4dj
(5 + 6di + 4didj + 6dj)
;
Si =
2(1 + di)(1 + 2dj)
2
(5 + 6di + 4didj + 6dj)2
;
i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j:
If the rm i separates and the rm j integrates, the retailersprot maximization problems:8<: maxqi i = (1  qi   qj)qi   wiqimax
qj
j = (1  qj   qi)qj   12djq2j
with the rst order conditions and solution:(
1  2qi   qj   wi = 0
1  (2 + dj) qj   qi = 0
9
(
qi =
1+dj wi(2+dj)
3+2dj
qj =
1+wi
3+2dj
: (8)
Plugging (8) into i = P (qi + qj)qi   12diq2i and optimizing with respect to wi, we obtain
wi =
(1+dj)(2di+didj 1)
(2+dj)(2+2dj+didj+2di)
. The equilibrium quantities and prots are given by:
(
qLi =
1+dj
(2+2dj+didj+2di)
qFj =
1+dj+2di+didj
(2+dj)(2+2dj+didj+2di)8<: Li =
(1+dj)
2
2(2+dj)(2+2dj+didj+2di)2
Fj =
(1+dj+2di+didj)
2
2(2+dj)(2+2dj+didj+2di)2
By a symmetry argument, if the rm j separates and the rm i integrates then retailersprots
are: (
Fi =
(1+di+2dj+didj)
2
2(2+di)(2+2dj+didj+2di)2
Lj =
(1+di)
2
2(2+di)(2+2di+didj+2dj)2
:
The following proposition says that each rm has an incentive to separate, given that its rival
integrates, hence fI; Ig cannot be an equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 1 Li > 
C
i > 
F
i for any d1  0; d2  0:
Proof. This is obvious given that Li is the Stackerberg leaders prot and 
F
i the Stackerberg
followers prot.
Consider the set (d1; d2); di = i(dj); such that the rm i is indi¤erent between separating
and integrating, given that the rm j separates:
Fi =
(1 + di + 2dj + didj)
2
2(2 + di)(2 + 2dj + didj + 2di)2
=
2(1 + di)(1 + 2dj)
2
(5 + 6di + 4didj + 6dj)2
= Si : (9)
It can be shown that i(dj); determined by (9), is strictly concave and has a unique maximum,
i(0) > 0; 9dj : i(dj) = 0: The Figure 1 gives a graphical representation of i(dj) and j(di).
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F2 > 
S
2 above the dashed line, 
F
1 > 
S
1 right at the dotted line.
In the zone A (low d1 and low d2), both rms have relatively at marginal cost curves.
Each rm prefers to separate given that its rival separates, hence the unique equilibrium is {S,
S}. The equilibrium prot of each rm is lower than in the Cournot equilibrium, yet higher
than the Stackelberg followers prot: Fi < 
S
i < 
C
i . Although inside the zone A the rms
may di¤er in e¢ ciency, this di¤erence is su¢ cient. In the zone C (low d1 and moderate d2),
the rm 1 is more e¢ cient than rm 2, but the di¤erence in e¢ ciency is not too high. Then
the strategy S is dominant for the rm 1, while the rm 2 chooses I if the rm 1 chooses
S : F1 < 
S
1 < 
C
i ;
C
2 > 
F
2 > 
S
2 : In the zone D (low d1 and moderate d2), the situation is
the opposite to that of zone C: the rm 2 is more e¢ cient then the rm 2, but the di¤erence in
e¢ ciency is not too high. Then the strategy S is dominant strategy for the rm 1 while the rm
2 chooses I; if the rm 1 chooses S : F1 < 
S
1 < 
C
i ;
C
2 > 
F
2 > 
S
2 : Finally, the zone B is such
that (either d1 or d2 or both are su¢ ciently high). Either both rms are less e¢ cient than in
the zone A, or the asymmetry in rmscost is very high. In this case each rm chooses I; if its
rival chooses S. Therefore, two asymmetric equilibria, {I, S}, {S, I}, exist.
The following proposition summurizes the results:
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Proposition 2 Given d1  0; d2  0; fS; Sg is an equilibrium, if (d1; d2) 2 A = f (d1; d2)j d1 
1(d2); d2  2(d1)g;
both fS; Ig and fI; Sg are equilibria, if (d1; d2) 2 B = f (d1; d2)j d1  1(d2); d2  2(d1)g;
f; Ig is an equilibrium, if (d1; d2) 2 C = f (d1; d2)j d1  1(d2); d2  2(d1)g;
fI; Sg is an equilibrium, if (d1; d2) 2 D = f (d1; d2)j d1  1(d2); d2  2(d1)g.
Corollary 3 In the symmetric game with Ci(q) = Cj(q) = dq2 there exists a unique bd such that,
if d < bd; then fS; Sgis the unique equilibrium and, if d > bd; there are two asymmetric equilibria:
fI; Sg and fS; Ig.
In particular, bd  0:47 < 12 and dwidwj = dwidwj   0:01 < 0 for d1 = d2 = bd: Thus, asymmetric
equilibria in the symmetric game arise even if the wholesale prices are not strategic complements,
given that the degree of substitution between them is su¢ ciently low.
3.1 Robustness
As the analysis in the Section 2 suggests, increasing marginal costs and cost asymmetry are
the driving forces for the existence of asymmetric equilibria. According to (5), the degree of
substitutability between w1 and w2 crucially depends on the slope of marginal cost function
(that is, on C 00i (q)). Even in the case that the demand function is non-linear, but C
00(q) is
su¢ ciently high, w1 and w2 are weak substitutes ( dwidwj negative and close to zero), or even
complements ( dwidwj > 0). This results in strong competition between the manufacturers in the
wholesale prices and results in high output levels and low prots. It can be shown that if the
goods are imperfect substitutes, the e¤ect of a change in wi on qj is that the rm js marginal
revenue and its marginal cost are smaller compared to the case of perfect substitutes. Still the
substitutability or complementarity between wj and wi depends on the slope of the rm js
marginal curve. Hence, given that the degree of goods substitution is su¢ ciently high, the same
qualitative results hold. Thus, the results of the model are robust with respect to the linearity
of the demand function and homogeneity of the goods.
4 Conclusion
In this paper I have analyzed the incentives of rms to separate (sell through an independent
exclusive retailers), or integrate (be a retailer of ones own good) under quantity competition.
The main result is that the equilibrium critically depends on rmscost structures. For the case of
quadratic cost functions, I have shown the following: if the cost asymmetry is small and marginal
curves functions are su¢ ciently at, in the unique equilibrium of the game both rms separate. If
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the asymmetry in cost is extremely high, or both rmsmarginal cost curves are su¢ ciently steep,
then each rm prefers to integrate, given that it rivals separates, and therefore two asymmetric
equilibria arise. Finally, under moderate asymmetry in costs and one rms marginal curve being
steep, with the second rmmarginal curve being at, there is a unique equilibrium in which
the rst rm integrates, whereas the second separates. The following intuition for these results
is as follows. Each rms prefers to separate, given that its rival integrates. In this case, a
separated rm gets the Stackelberg leaders prot and an integrated rm gets the Stackelbergs
follower prot. If two symmetric rms separate, their prots depend on strength of competition
in the wholesale prices among producers. The strength of this competition is in turn determined
by the slope of the marginal cost functions, higher slopes implying stronger competition. A
strong competition results in low wholesale prices, high output levels and prots lower than the
Stackelberg followers prot. In this case, there are two asymmetric equilibrium in which one
rm separates and the other integrates. If the competition in wholesale prices is weak, each rm
prefers to separate given that its rival separates. Thus, in the unique symmetric equilibrium
both rms separate.If rms di¤er in the costs, the degree of asymmetry plays a crucial role. If
the asymmetry is not very high, the rm 1s marginal curve is at and the rm 2s marginal
curve steep, the rm 1s dominant strategy is to separate, while the rm 2 prefers to integrate,
given that the rm 1 separates. There is a unique equilibrium, in which one rm separates and
the other integrates. If the cost asymmetry is very high (e.g., the rm 1 has a at marginal-cost
curve, whereas the rm 2 a very steep one), it is protable for the rm 1 to integrate, given that
the rm 2 separates. This occurs when the increase in rm 1s prot from the increase in its own
quantity is lower than the decrease in its prot resulting from the increase in its competitors
quantity. Thus, if the wholesale price of the rm 2 is a strong complement to the one of the rm
1, there are two asymmetric equilibria. Moreover, in one of them the more e¢ cient rm (the
rm 1) integrates and the less e¢ cient rm (the rm 2) separates.
My analysis provides a possible explanation for the widely observed asymmetry in rmssales
strategies, based on decreasing economies of scales and cost asymmetries. It is worth to note that
in the model separation neither implies a change in the production function, nor is associated
with additional costs. In this sense, I have shown the existence of asymmetric equilibria in a
"pure" separation game.Moreover, in the paper, I have analyzed the case of quadratic costs and
a linear demand function. Further research is needed to be don on the su¢ cient and necessary
conditions for the existence of di¤erent equilibria under more general assumptions about cost
and demand functions. I am delegating this task to the future.
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